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In 1903, as European tensions began to mount, Jean Jaurès declared his faith in the possibility 
of securing a peace that was 'profound, durable, organised and definitive'. The two 'great 
systems of alliances' which, for now, merely held each other in check, would produce strong 
and lasting friendships; democracy was extending across the continent and it would not be 
long before 'all human groups from Finland to Ireland, from Poland to Alsace' would discover 
their 'moral affinities' and find 'reciprocal security' through disarmament.
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 Others were less 
sanguine about the prospects for peace in Europe. Just four years later, Bertha von Sutter, the 
first female recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, acknowledged that European state relations 
were predicated on the precarious 'condition which exists between two wars', and that the 
stronger commitment to pacifism, which she understood as 'peace on a sound basis', was 
lacking.
2
 That Jaurès lost his life to the bullet of a disgruntled nationalist on the 31
st
 July 
1914, just three days before France was once again at war with Germany, suggests that von 
Sutter had a point. Yet both sides to this debate held one view in common, namely, that the 
key to European security turned on the condition of Franco-German relations and that the 
prospects for peace lay in resolving their rivalry. Given the lasting legacy of the Paris 
Commune, it is not surprising that this belief also pervaded European socialist circles or, as 
Moira Donald argues, that the main driver for the establishment of the Second International 
in 1889 was the desire to find a way of containing and defusing Franco-German hostility.
3
  
Historians have explained the failure of this initiative to prevent the outbreak of war 
in 1914 in different ways, of which organisational paralysis, the inability to overcome deep-
seated personal animosities, sectarianism and the apparently irresistible force of national 
patriotic appeals are frequently emphasised. Political miscalculation also played an important 
2 
 
part: it is a commonplace to present the image of a socialist movement caught unawares by 
the outbreak of war in 1914. There is, however, general consensus about the disastrousness of 
the result. Whether it is suggested that in ‘July 1914 the workers’ movement did not consider 
the possibility of war’ or that ‘the war ambushed Europe’s socialists’, its impact was, 
regardless, profound, demonstrating the hollowness of much of the movement’s 
internationalist rhetoric and, in its failure to mount effective anti-war agitation, checking the 
swelling labour unrest that had characterised the pre-war years.
4
 For Rosa Luxemburg, who 
had held fast to the idea that the war represented nothing but the ‘horrors of imperialist 
bestiality in Europe’, the ‘capitulation of … social democracy’ represented a ‘world 
tragedy’.5  
If the outbreak of war in 1914 was a climacteric for socialists, posing difficult 
questions regarding allegiance, the same is true of the anarchist movement. However, while 
there is a considerable literature examining the shortcomings of the mainstream European 
socialist movement, very little work has been done on the anarchist response to the war. This 
is despite the fact, as Benedict Anderson noted, that anarchism was the 'dominant element in 
the self-consciously internationalist radical Left' in the latter decades of the nineteenth 
century,
6
 and all of the belligerents hosted anarchist groups and dissidents of varying 
organisational acumen and practical strength. This volume takes a first step toward filling this 
gap. It looks closely at the bitter dispute about intervention between two of European 
anarchism’s most important figures, both marooned in British exile, Peter Kropotkin and 
Errico Malatesta, which split the global anarchist movement in 1914. In turn, it examines the 
politics of internationalism and anti-militarism in order to explain this division and consider 
how it contributed to the re-shaping of post-war anarchist politics. Kropotkin's controversial 
decision to throw his weight behind the Entente against the Central powers fittingly takes 
centre stage in the contributions by Davide Turcato, Peter Ryley and Carl Levy. Its 
3 
 
reverberations are examined in the US context by Kenyon Zimmer, in the Dutch movement 
by Bert Altena and the French, by Constance Bantman and David Berry. The politics of 
anarchist internationalism and anti-militarism are discussed in Lukas Keller's account of 
German anarchism and in Ole Birk Laursen's analysis of the murky plots that prompted 
anarchist internationalists to support the Indian anti-colonial nationalist campaigns hoping to 
capitalise on Britain’s distracted gaze. One of the central findings of the volume is that, far 
from describing two static positions, the division between pro-war and anti-war anarchists 
emerged from a complex of ideas, importantly shaped by local and political cultural contexts, 
about the kind of peace that capitalist states maintained, the causes and likely effects of war 
and the processes of revolutionary change. 
The scale of the challenge that confronted anarchist activists upon the outbreak of 
war, and its dramatic effect on anarchist movements, is prominent in both Zimmer and 
Keller’s contributions. Popular patriotism, emergency legislation and the loss of comrades to 
the trenches proved to be a toxic mix that all but destroyed pre-war networks and 
organisations. If the practical demands of total war and the radically altered ideological 
atmosphere it created seriously undercut the ability of anarchists to organise effective 
opposition, the renewal of radical dissidence in Russia posed further challenges. The 
Bolshevik coup, discussed by Levy, Allan Antliff and Bantman and Berry, further depleted 
anarchist energies, at first exacerbating internal divisions as Kropotkin called for the 
continuation of the war against Germany after 1917, and eventually leading anarchists to 
place themselves on the wrong side of the historic socialist victory.  
Yet despite all the repression, splits and fractured friendships, the experience of war 
and anti-war activism also invigorated anarchist politics. Indeed, a leitmotif running through 
the entire book is the idea that Kropotkin’s decision to support the Entente, as divisive as it 
was, encouraged reflection on anarchism’s central principles that captured the minds of 
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thinkers and activists on a global scale. The essays by Kathy Ferguson, Matthew Adams and 
Antliff show how the combination of war and revolution brought well-honed anarchist 
conceptions of violence, state power and mutual aid into sharp relief, stimulating new 
approaches to resistance, transformation and social relationships that were shaped by anti-
militarism. Crucially, this was an anti-militarism now cognisant of the shape of modern 
warfare, changes that the modernist pioneer Wyndham Lewis hinted at in the final issue of 
Blast, published in 1915, as he looked at the opening acts of the war in an attempt to imagine 
the future of warfare:  
 
War has definitely and for good gone under the ground, up in the air, and is 
quickly submerging itself down to the bed of the ocean. In peace time, now, the 
frontiers will be a line of trenches and tunnels with miles of wire and steel mazes, 
and entanglements crackling with electricity, which no man will be able to pass. 
Everything will be done down below in future, or up above.
7
    
 
Against this backdrop, the acrimonious clash about intervention and the experience of being 
caught on the wrong side of the revolution encouraged anarchists both to reaffirm their 
deeply held rejection of vanguard socialism and to develop strategies that drew on a plethora 
of anti-war activities. We consider the impact of the war on anarchism at the end of this 
essay, but first turn to the debate that split the movement and the politics that underpinned 
Kropotkin's apparent betrayal of anarchist principle.  
 
Cultural nationalism, patriotism and the war 
The anarchists' inability to the hold fast to their internationalist principles is sometimes 
explained as a result of an ideological hostility to organisation.
8
 More familiar in anarchist 
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critique is the suggestion that Kropotkin and the signatories of the Manifesto of the Sixteen – 
the collective statement issued by a number of Europe’s leading anarchists in 1916 that 
insisted on the necessity of victory over the Central powers – were impelled by a deep-seated 
‘Francophilism’, to borrow a phrase from Levy’s contribution. Perhaps a more historically 
apposite phrase might be that beloved by Luxemburg and Lenin to denounce those socialists 
acquiescing to the demands of their national governments – ‘social chauvinist’- a term that 
certainly describes the feelings of many of Kropotkin’s ex-comrades, and gives a flavour of 
the rancour his arguments produced. If the popular image of Malatesta’s role in this great 
struggle for the heart of European anarchism is that of the voice of principle – insisting on the 
necessity of holding fast to class solidarity, remaining aloof from national attachments and 
warning that victory for either side augured further, more devastating war – Kropotkin 
assumes the obverse role, of the apostate who in Leon Trotsky’s words, ‘made use of the war 
to disavow everything he had been teaching for almost half a century.’9 Contra Malatesta, the 
predominant image of Kropotkin is one of an activist in his twilight years, out of touch with 
geopolitical realities, and possessing failing intellectual powers. His decision to support the 
war effort, and then use his prominence within the movement to encourage general 
participation, is read as an indication of a thinly veiled patriotism, ‘chilling’ apostasy, or 
obstreperous arrogance.
10
 All of which is captured in George Woodcock’s rather Pooterish 
picture of Kropotkin being wheeled around Brighton in a bath-chair, haranguing the editor of 
Freedom Thomas Keell for his anti-war views from a living-room decorated with the flags of 
the Entente powers. Ryley defends Kropotkin's interventionism, contextualising it through a 
critical analysis of the British peace movement; for Woodcock, despite a lifelong sympathy 
for Kropotkin and his work, it was evidence of a ‘defection from the libertarian tradition’.11 
In wider socialist circles, interventionist debates were importantly framed by 
arguments about the movement's own revolutionary heritage. Lying behind the Union Sacrée 
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was an appeal to ‘egalitarian sentiment and republican tradition’ that not only shaped 
mainstream political culture in France, but was highly significant given that most socialist 
groups traced their origins back to theoretical positions created in the aftermath of the 
Revolution.
12
 As one historian has noted, for socialists in France seeking to rally the 
recalcitrant, there was a ‘common thread’ between the war of 1914 and the Revolutionary 
Wars at the turn of the nineteenth century: a defence of liberty.
13
 Rather than seeing the First 
World War through Lenin’s eyes as a product of imperialism, many socialists understood the 
war as a war of liberation, in which a despotic monarch to the east imperilled the home of the 
European revolutionary tradition. The seductiveness of readings like this is demonstrated by 
their appeal even to British socialist groups like the Fabians and Social Democratic 
Federation. In spite of a strain of liberal voluntarism running through British socialism, they 
were able countenance ideas of military service with apparently far more ease than anti-
militarists in the Third Republic, whose commitment to republican values was undermined by 
a poisonous mix of brutal military discipline, martial injustice and the deployment of troops 
against striking workers.
14
  
For anarchists, it might be expected that such conventional models held little appeal, 
and were consequentially of minimal relevance in 1914. Yet the cultural prejudices that 
commonly underpinned ideas of the Union sacrée or Burgfriedenspolitik were widely shared 
by anarchists on both sides of the interventionist debate. Anarchists including Kropotkin 
readily adopted the kind of idioms that were regularly exploited in war propaganda to, for 
example, laud Belgian troops equipped with 'the doggedness of the English type' or depict the 
Serb soldier as a 'hero, a born fighter, and a fatalist'.
15
 But as Zimmer demonstrates, the 
interventionist position extended along a spectrum and these languages of patriotism were not 
indicative of a shared politics: Domela Nieuwenhuis broke with Kropotkin but used the same 
anti-German tropes, as Altena notes; and Ferguson's account of Emma Goldman's calls to 
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resist conscription indicate that these were couched similarly as patriotic appeals to defend 
American traditions. Anti-militarism was also frequently legitimised in terms of the defence 
of republican values: 'I am no patriot' Ernest Crosby wrote in his anti-militarist classic 
Swords and Plowshares, 'I love my country too well to be a patriot'.
16
  
Within the interventionist camp, Kropotkin's reading of the French Revolution holds 
some clues to the emergence of fault lines that would crucially shape his decision to back the 
Entente. His identification with France was profound and his interest in the French 
Revolution lifelong. When he at last produced a comprehensive study of the Revolution, a 
book running to nearly six-hundred pages published just five years before the outbreak of 
war, it had a discernible whiff of republican musket powder. But as much as other socialists 
looked to the levée en masse and the ‘citizen-soldier’ as the embodiment of national virtue 
that was appropriate with France imperilled once more, Kropotkin’s position was more 
ambiguous.
17
  
On the one hand, he followed French anarchist conventions: the enragés who opposed 
the Jacobin's centralising, universalist, nationalist politics that ultimately undermined the 
Revolution, were the anarchists' intellectual ancestors.
18
 This critique developed a line of 
thought that extended back to Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Pondering whether the experience of 
1789 had discredited the idea of revolution, Proudhon argued that the ‘revolutionaries [had] 
failed in their mission after the fall of the Bastille’. Neglecting ‘economic ideas’ and forced 
onto the defensive by invasion, ‘the nation was again delivered into the hands of warriors and 
lawyers’, replacing the rule of ‘nobility, clergy and monarchy’ with that of ‘Anglomaniac 
constitutionaries, classic republicans [and] militaristic democrats.’19 Aligning himself with 
this tradition, Kropotkin identified authoritarianism with a tradition that extended from 
Robespierre to Marxist social democracy and, eventually linking German centralism with 
Russian vanguardism, was thus immediately critical of the Bolshevik take-over.
20
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On the other hand, Kropotkin also defended the French Revolution as a liberating 
moment. However problematically, he saw France’s military effort in 1792 as a spontaneous 
uprising of peasants along the ‘frontier departments’, who recognised in the approaching 
royalist armies the return of the rule of the ‘nobles and clergy’.21 Kropotkin also downplayed 
the role of the levée, preferring to see democratisation – ‘new leaders, openly republican, 
ris[ing] from the ranks’ – as the key reason for France’s military success. For all that he 
emphasised the localised initiative behind the levée, he linked it to the broader centralisation 
of the revolution, suggesting that the ‘Committee of Public Welfare took advantage of the 
first military successes to demand and obtain … almost dictatorial powers.’22 The extension 
of the revolution beyond France’s borders clearly posed some difficult questions. To 
Kropotkin’s mind, however, this was undoubtedly – even when led by the ‘ex-sans-culotte, 
now… general of the sans-culottes’ Napoleon – about preserving hard-won liberties and 
relative freedoms. Indeed, he concluded that Napoleon’s coup d’état, while reining the 
revolutionary momentum and reconstituting aristocratic rule, could not check the ‘impulsion’ 
that had been given to ideas that reconfigured European politics: ‘the absolute monarch-
master of his subjects – and the lord-master of the soil and the peasants … have both 
disappeared’. Seeing divine right and feudalism vanquished, Kropotkin wondered in closing: 
‘which of the nations will take upon herself the terrible but glorious task of the next great 
revolution?’23    
As Levy and Turcato point out, Kropotkin and Malatesta both drew on the heritage of 
revolution to distinguish struggles for liberation from statist and capitalist wars of 
domination. Their disagreement did not turn on the principle of entering into resistance 
struggles, but on the extent to which the threat that 'autocratic' Germany posed to 
'revolutionary' France could be understood in these terms. Kropotkin's history of the French 
Revolution highlighted a less than enthusiastic embrace of republicanism but also opened up 
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a theoretical space between the emergence of revolutionary ideals and the processes of 
revolutionary transformation. His history suggested that it was possible to destroy the 
revolution without destroying its principles. In 1914, Kropotkin concluded that it was 
imperative to defend those principles, even though they had been badly distorted by their 
institutionalisation. This argument pointed to a particular conception of internationalism and 
anti-militarism that Malatesta did not share.  
 
Internationalism and anti-militarism 
Critics sometimes argue that Kropotkin’s interventionism rested on a grand view of the 
unfolding of human history, an idea that critics describe as the product of a materialism 
which pointed towards the natural evolution of anarchy and ultimately left an ambiguous role 
for revolution.
24
 For a number of reasons, Malatesta dissented from this view. Indeed, one of 
Malatesta’s key indictments of Kropotkin’s philosophical system was what he saw as its 
fatalism. In Malatesta’s words, Kropotkin’s position suggested that 'logically all we can do is 
to contemplate what is happening in the world with indifference, pleasure or pain … without 
hope and without the possibility of changing anything.’25  
The implication is not that Malatesta lacked a sense of history – after all, few thinkers 
with a foot in the nineteenth century could escape the attractions of historical argument
26
 – 
but that historical examples held less appeal for him than for Kropotkin because he was not 
interested in outlining a theory of history. As he pointedly commented, 'Society moves 
forward or backward depending on which forces and wills prevail, mocking any of those 
“historical laws” that may explain past events more or less adequately (more often 
inadequately than not).'
27
 Paradoxically though, when Malatesta did reach for historical 
examples to buttress his polemical writing, they were often of the sweeping kind impugned 
by critics of historical determinism. In these instances, Malatesta saw in the ‘lessons of 
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history’ the continual necessity of preparing for a coming conflict between ‘the oppressed’ 
and the ‘privileged classes’, insisting that governments never willingly abandon their power 
nor the bourgeoisie their privileges.
28
 France in 1789 proved this, he noted elsewhere, 
insisting that the ‘history of past revolutions provides quite splendid proof’ that all 
revolutions are ‘determined’ by a series of local rebellions that ‘prepared minds for the 
fray’.29 The prospect of revolutionary change was therefore perpetually imminent, its fortunes 
resting on the ability of anarchists to promote their ideas in order to shape impulsive acts of 
resistance in ways that would avoid perpetuating the follies of revolutions past. It was from 
this perspective that Malatesta viewed the war, a crisis that validated anarchist arguments 
concerning the connivance of capitalists and imperialists, but also opened up fresh 
possibilities and pointed to the pressing urgency of radical change.               
 In 1914, anarchists wrestled with potential histories. The dichotomy of war and 
revolution infused their debates and, as Berry and Bantman argue in the French context, the 
positions that anarchists took on the question of intervention strongly coloured their 
responses to the Bolshevik revolution. And principled commitments to internationalism and 
against militarism assumed a central place in these arguments: the threat posed by militarism 
to internationalism painted a picture of the future that appeared to undercut the prospects for 
revolution. By the same token, the possibility of waging an internationalist struggle – 
arguably a more realistic prospect post-1917 than in the early days of 1914 – against the war 
offered the hope of fundamental social transformation.  
Although some of the crowds to mass in 1914 opposed the war and although many of 
the 'enthusiasts' were neither seduced by jingoistic appeals nor deluded in their reasoning to 
accept it,
30
 the mobilizations of 1914 appeared to render the case for revolution purely 
academic. Yet as the Christmases past and domestic conditions worsened across central and 
eastern Europe, the war afforded new opportunities for those revolutionary socialists that had 
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either resisted participation in government, or were freshly radicalised in the face of looming 
economic catastrophe. The Zimmerwald Conference held in Switzerland at the start of 
September 1915 gave early expression to these feelings. Seeking to heal the wounds caused 
by the fragmentation of the socialist movement – as its manifesto declared, to ‘retie the torn 
threads of international relations’ – and railing against a Europe resembling ‘a gigantic 
human slaughter-house’, it called on revolutionaries to take up the anti-war struggle ‘with full 
force’.31 One delegate particularly keen on the idea that the destabilisations of war presented 
a real chance for meaningful change was Lenin, already exiled in Switzerland at the time of 
the conference, but with eyes fixed firmly on the increasingly volatile political situation in his 
homeland. Having always been sceptical about the Second International's preventive anti-war 
measures, he counselled revolutionaries to play the long-game in 1914 and ditch proposals to 
launch a mass action at the war's commencement. His policy had been to prepare '“to 
transform the imperialist war into a civil war for socialism"'.
 32
 That meant disassociating 
from the pursuit of the war and standing against popular patriotic fervour. As Keller argues, 
this was a costly, if not implausible strategy for anarchists operating in situations where they 
were already painted as social outcasts. Yet as Lenin made clear in a draft resolution for the 
Zimmerwald conference, in which he dismissed the war as a ‘defence of the great-power 
privileges and advantages’, the conflict had decisively created ‘a revolutionary situation, and 
has generated revolutionary sentiments and discontent’. The task of ‘Social-Democrats [is] to 
maintain and develop’ this dissatisfaction, ‘clear[ing] the revolutionary awareness of the 
masses and purg[ing] their minds of the falsehood of bourgeois and socialist chauvinism’.33  
 Lenin's policy resonated with a whole range of revolutionary socialists, including 
anarchists, who drew back to the shared principles of the First International and associated 
internationalism with anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, class solidarity and the transcendence 
of national boundaries.
34
 This conception had infused the pre-war transnational activism of 
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international labour organisations, notably the Industrial Workers of the World and Dora 
Montefiore's anti-racist and pro-feminist socialism,
35
 and it shaped Malatesta's proposal for a 
new international (La Mondiale) to rebuild the revolutionary socialist movement.
36
 
Nevertheless, it was not unproblematic.  
The tensions between the socialist idea of internationalism and the pressures active on 
pre-war European politics have been well documented by historians. Reviewing socialist 
history in 1949 and hinting at the contradictory forces acting on socialists, Harold Laski 
argued that 'the parallel principle to socialism has not been internationalism, but self-
determination'.
37
 Socialists active in the borderlands of failing European empires, notably 
Russia and Austria Hungary, felt the problems of reconciling internationalism with anti-
imperialist national struggles particularly acutely. As Liliana Riga shows, the Polish 
Bolsheviks Feliks Dzierżyńksi and Karl Radek were not only forced to confront the pressures 
that ethnic identities placed on socialist internationalism, they also met them in conflicting 
ways. While Radek supported a peasant land movement to attack Polish and Austrian 
landowners, Dzierżyńksi's proletarian national-internationalist struggle was directed against 
Russification and Tsarist oppression.
38
 Important conceptual challenges to socialist 
internationalism were also made in the pre-war period. In America, Jewish and Black 
workers questioned lazy assumptions about the connection between racism and capitalism 
and argued that 'race would not simply vanish with socialism'.
39
 These issues played out in 
socialist anti-militarism, too. 
Socialist anti-militarism was intimately associated with internationalism and was 
typically invoked to decry a range of phenomena: increases in military spending, aggressive 
and expansionist foreign policies, domestic repression and the propagation of nationalist and 
jingoist sentiments that encouraged preparedness for war and paved the way for the 
deployment of troops against civilians. In Europe, anti-militarist activism correlated strongly 
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with compulsory military service, boosted by the economic impact of the globalisation of the 
world economy, in that movements flourished in states where conscripts endured appalling 
maltreatment, and were aware of the economic opportunities they were being forced to forego 
as a result of their systematic abuse.
40
 Yet while socialist theories of militarism were sharply 
at odds with mainstream progressive historical accounts, such as that advanced by the Italian 
liberal and historian Guglielmo Ferrero, which plotted the civilising evolution of European 
peace-building,
41
as much separated socialist analysts as united them against liberals. There 
was a considerable theoretical gap between the orthodox Marxist view advanced by Karl 
Kautsky which rooted militarism in class power and the idea advanced by Karl Liebknecht 
which associated militarism with a broader understanding of domination.
42
 Thus while anti-
militarism became a central tenet of socialist internationalism, gathering momentum as the 
European arms race gathered pace, the nature of militarism remained theoretically hazy. As 
Kropotkin also argued in his 1914 pamphlet, Wars and Capitalism,
43
 it was possible to talk of 
a military-industrial complex and understand war as a result of capitalism. But since there 
was no agreement between revolutionary socialists about the nature of the state and the 
relationship of the state to capitalism, it was impossible to predict how anti-militarist 
commitments would be expressed in terms of policy in any particular situation.  
In strategic terms too, socialists diverged considerably in their approaches towards 
militarism. As Altena describes, for instance, socialists in the Second International clashed 
over Domela Nieuwenhuis's proposal for a general strike. Anti-militarists were also divided 
in their ethical responses to war. Some linked anti-militarism to pacifism while others, like 
Liebknecht, called for the creation of a citizen army. Entrenched racism could also play into 
these issues. The fear of the 'yellow peril' that fuelled the White Australia Policy that Dora 
Montefiore struggled against was seen by some socialists to be important enough to drop 
their objections to conscription in defence of the British colonial power.
44
 Even Liebknecht, 
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still regarded as one of 'the most important and consistent representatives of Marxist anti-
militarism'
45
endorsed a class-based internationalist anti-militarist strategy that bore traces of 
racism. Contrasting the army of 'the American negro or East Prussian menial slave',
46
 with 
the 'class conscious' proletarian militia, he argued that the former was intellectually and 
economically inferior to the latter and consequently more easily seduced by militarist 
trappings. Fearful of the disciplining effects of militarism, Liebknecht argued that the 
proletariat was, in contrast, 'supremely indifferent to the international task of the army and 
the whole capitalist policy of expansion',
47
 and therefore better equipped to fight the class 
war.  
While Kropotkin's analysis of war and capitalism appears to add weight to the 
accusation that he betrayed his principles in 1914, the messiness of internationalist anti-
militarism suggests a different reading. Socialists struggling against imperial powers in 
Europe were not more likely to support the war than those in apparently stable states such as 
France of Germany. Anti-war sentiments prevailed in the Hungarian anarchist movement, for 
example.
48
 Nevertheless, socialist reflections on internationalism complicated the principle of 
class solidarity to which anti-war revolutionary socialists typically appealed and showed how  
'internationalism' and 'anti-militarism' could be disassembled and re-constructed in multiple 
ways. While the Italian anarchist Luigi Bertoni made common cause with Indian nationalists 
on the basis of a perceived shared commitment to terrorist methods and anti-imperialism, as 
Laursen shows, French artists recalibrated their aesthetic violence once directed against the 
French militarist state, transforming ‘the politics of class war into a cultural narrative 
concerning war between nations'.
49
 For Mark Antliff, Henri Gaudier-Brezka's decision to 
enlist did not 'signal his rejection of anarchism', even though it led him to detach his earlier 
advocacy of revolutionary anti-militarism from his enduring commitment to anti-capitalist 
struggle.
50
 In this light, Kropotkin's interventionist stance appears less like a betrayal of 
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principle than a divergence from a dominant but contested socialist norm. Kropotkin shared 
Liebknecht's view that 'Prusso-German militarism had all the bad and dangerous qualities of 
any kind of Capitalist militarism' and had dubbed what Liebknecht called this 'exemplary 
model of militarism',
51
 Caesarism.
52
 In 1914, Kropotkin relinquished his hopes that 
revolutionary militias would meet German aggression, but this did not mean that he had also 
abandoned his commitment to anarchism or to anti-capitalist internationalism. 
Debates about observable processes of internationalisation - so-called new 
internationalism - help to further contextualise Kropotkin's internationalist ideas. Examining 
the relationship between nationalism and internationalism, Martin Geyer and Johannes 
Paulmann argue that pre-war thinking was importantly shaped by the analysis of these 
processes.
53
 Alert to the growth of a plethora of international organisations, pre-war 
intellectuals anticipated the globalisation debates initiated in the 1980s to prescribe policies 
for the unimpeded development of internationalism that pulled in contrary directions. Some 
associated internationalism with laissez-faire economics and the free flow of capital, usually 
also linking it with peace-building. Yet unlike old internationalism, new internationalism had 
nothing to do with ethics or ideology. It simply described the serendipitous action of free 
market forces. For Harold Bolce, new internationalism had been 'engineered by the very 
money power against which all the idealistic isms rail, stands, despite the incidental evils it 
inflicts, for a world peace, equilibrium, and progress.'
54
 Equally sceptical about old Kantian 
ideas, other internationalist critics of the free market ideal injected democracy into the mix. 
For the peace activist G.H. Perris the 'newer Internationalism' was 'neither a culture without a 
political and economic base, nor an economic policy lacking support in culture and political 
ethics'. Above all, he wrote, new internationalism was democratic. 'Its chief aim ... is to bring 
the democratic sentiment of every progressive country into contact with that of every other'.
55  
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Kropotkin's anarchist conception of decentralised federation was clearly at odds with 
these internationalising visions, but the dynamic processes they highlighted usefully 
facilitates the reassessment of his conception of revolutionary change, his Germanophobia 
and his questioning of class solidarity. Like Malatesta, Kropotkin believed that 'society 
moves forward or backward depending on which forces and wills prevail'. But he did not 
think of these forces solely in terms of the struggle between class and capitalism or, as Levy 
and Turcato argue of Malatesta, consider that the cultural and political differences between 
the belligerents were effectively negated by capitalism. Kropotkin linked the 
internationalising effects of war to the collapse of empire in central and eastern Europe and 
the re-affirmation of the anarchist revolutionary ideal – which Jacobinism had perverted - in 
the internationalist actions of the national groups who struggled for their liberation. 
Kropotkin's internationalism fused Dzierżyńksi's anti-Russification politics with Radek's 
revolutionary land movement anticipating the collapse of empire. To Kropotkin’s mind, the 
advance of Germany, the dominant power in Europe, threatened to smother these initiatives 
and thus, move internationalism backwards. German advance meant the advance of 
militarism and it opened the door to Jacobinism in Russia. His implicit, problematic, 
understanding of the role of Jacobinism in derailing the revolutionary momentum in 1793 
thus fed into his understanding of Bolshevism and his insistence that Russian revolution 
required the continuance of the war.
56
 For a thinker that had commented before the Russian 
Revolution that ‘Jacobinists and Anarchists have existed at all times among reformers and 
revolutionists’, it is apparent that this historical lesson was at the forefront of his mind as he 
negotiated events between 1914 and 1917.
57
    
As Peter Ryley notes, Kropotkin's stance raised considerable difficulties. Believing that 
the prospects for a revolutionary war disappeared with the voting of war credits and the 
European mobilisations, Kropotkin overlooked the systematic oppression that German 
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activists faced in the years leading up to the war, outlined by Keller. He underestimated the 
extraordinary pressures that states exerted on individuals to drive enlistment and the violence 
meted out on those who refused to comply. In addition, not appreciating that the ‘enthusiasm’ 
for war would fail to silence anti-war sentiment,
58
 he alienated himself from the broad non-
sectarian anti-war movements and non-conscription fellowships that sprang up in Britain and 
around the world.
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 Kropotkin also failed to consider the extent to which war was likely to 
accelerate the sociological changes that undercut decentralised federation, 'bolstering the state, 
boosting militarism and compromising his ideals', to borrow Ryley's formulation. The necessity of 
waging total war encouraged unparalleled governmental intervention in economic affairs, 
even if, as in Britain, this tended to amplify economic and political processes already 
underway.
60
 Nevertheless, ideas concerning the value of radical intervention that had 
previously loitered on the margins of political discourse moved to the centre, and the war also 
created the space for governmental participation that suited non-anarchist forms of 
socialism.
61
 A revealing example of these developments is the case of Arthur Henderson, 
Labour Party leader after the resignation of Ramsey MacDonald, who served in the wartime 
cabinets of both Henry Asquith and David Lloyd George. While an obvious representative of 
the liberal wing of the Labour Party in the pre-war years, Henderson’s comments towards the 
war’s end that the experience had ‘profoundly modified the economic system’, pointed, he 
believed, to a positive outcome for the future of socialism:   
 
Methods of State control which would once have been regarded as intolerable 
infringements … have been accepted without effective protest even from those 
bred in the individualist tradition of the last century … The extent and importance 
of these changes in methods of production, the control of industry, the 
management and distribution of labour, and the limitations imposed upon … 
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financiers and the enterprises of individual capitalists, practically involve a 
revolution … In four crowded and eventful years we have gathered the fruit of a 
century of economic evolution.
62
 
 
While Lenin hijacked the revolution in Russia, putting pay to Kropotkin's hopes for 
international federation, war also smothered the principles of voluntary association and 
mutual aid that Kropotkin had hoped to stimulate within states, preparing the way for the 
wholesale absorption of grass roots initiatives in state-controlled national welfare projects.
63
 
The warfare state was born. 
 
Anarchism and war 
Andrew Cornell has recently argued that pre-war American anarchism was invigorated by a 
cultural engagement with gender, sexual politics and art and that these innovative currents 
were lost to the movement until the period of anarchism's second wave, as a result of the 
violent repression of radicalism in the post-war years.
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 The essays by Ferguson, Antliff and 
Adams point to similar shifts in anarchist thinking. Neither the anarchists' failure to galvanise 
mass resistance to the war nor the Bolshevik's seizure of the revolutionary initiative 
foreclosed on the possibility of collective action; mass anarchist movements survived the 
European war. Nevertheless, the tension between nationalism and internationalism, the 
emergence of non-class cleavages associated with anti-colonial resistance, the increasing 
regulatory power of states that the war accelerated, and the polarisation of international 
politics engendered by Bolshevik success, provided a catalyst for a significant re-framing of 
anarchist politics. If its effects were not fully felt until 1968 when the student movement 
dubbed Soviet communism obsolete, the creative new left politics of civil disobedience, 
passive resistance, anti-racism, feminism, civil rights and personal liberation emerged and 
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was crystallised during the First World War, when anarchism was apparently obsolete. While 
Ferguson and Antliff show how the anti-war movement drew attention to the gendered 
character of state oppression and provided a platform for artists to aestheticise violence in 
ways that emphasised anarchism's creative energy, Adams examines how the memory of the 
war was felt in new drives towards social activism and change.  
 These changes in anarchist politics resonated across radical movements. C.K Ogden 
and Margaret Florence's critique of the militarist state, for example, dovetailed with Emma 
Goldman's struggle for free motherhood, discussed by Ferguson. 'Male humanity', they 
argued, 'has wobbled between two convictions', one that women 'exist for the entire benefit of 
contemporary mankind' and the other, 'that she exists for the entire benefit of the next 
generation'. Both supported the command to '"Be fruitful and multiply"', for men needed 
women to populate the battalions that 'warrior-statesman' required to conquer the earth.
65
 The 
argument altered the terms of the case often advanced by suffragettes, particularly as the 
British National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) moved from a stance of 
pro-neutrality to a position that saw the war as an opportunity to ‘show ourselves  to be 
worthy of citizenship’.66 For the women who accepted this shift, participating in war was a 
test of responsibility that deserved the franchise in return. For their anti-militarist sisters, the 
refusal to participate in war was the special task that fell to women, because they had the 
power to combat militarism and male domination.  
Yet the net effects of the war and the Bolshevik revolution were felt in particular 
ways within anarchist movements. On the one hand, anarchist disillusionment in Russia 
reinforced the commitment against vanguardism and generated ongoing debates about 
pacifism, non-violence, state repression and the nature and possibility of revolution. On the 
other, Kropotkin's disgrace arguably bolstered the convergence between anarchists and non-
anarchists on the central issues of class solidarity and anti-militarism. When, in the 1940s, 
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Rudolf Rocker described the struggle against Hitler's 'New Order' as the 'first duty of our 
time', Freedom Press lamented the reversal of his earlier anti-war position and endorsed 
Marcus Graham's critique, which aligned liberal imperialists with fascists and called on the 
workers to re-build the First International to oppose both.
67
  This hardening of position 
perhaps also diverted anarchists from the possibility of conceptualising 'the liberation of 
nation from state, along with the liberation of people from occupation and exploitation', as 
Maia Ramnath describes the nineteenth-century anarchist position.
68
  
At the same time, the re-evaluation of mutual aid as an ethic of association, detached 
from the revolutionary activism that Kropotkin associated with it, can also be traced to the 
war. As Adams argues, Herbert Read's anxieties about his own participation in the conflict 
led him to develop an idea that emphasised 'fidelity' – a principle capable of supporting 
horizontalism but not necessarily intimately tied to it. Indeed, Read offers an indicative 
example of how the contested memory of the war continued to shape anarchism. While by no 
means an uncontroversial figure in the anarchist tradition, Read is distinctive in that while an 
older generation of anarchist thinkers and activists struggled to come to terms with the war, 
he was engaged in fighting it. By turns harrowing and liberating, this experience informed an 
abhorrence of violence in Read that mutated into a pacifism that carried with it a preference 
for gradualist revolutionary tactics. The power of this memory in continuing to influence 
anarchist politics is reinforced by the example of Read’s friend Woodcock, who, despite 
being born in 1912, attributed his anarchist conversion to reading the war memoirists that 
were Read’s contemporaries – Robert Graves, Richard Aldington, Erich Maria Remarque – 
writers that did much to shape how the conflict was remembered.
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 Woodcock, along with 
Read and Alex Comfort, would all see themselves as having learned the lessons of the 
failures of 1914 in vociferously opposing war in 1939, and would also strip Kropotkinian 
politics to what they thought was its central contribution: demonstrating the utility, 
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immanence and constructive potential of mutual aid. In this way, shorn of the nineteenth 
century revolutionary baggage that they saw as redundant in a world that had witnessed the 
corruption of the Russian Revolution, anarchists might evade more-or-less entirely the 
problem of political violence. This position, aside from its questionably unrealistic 
appreciation of how revolutionary change is actually likely to unfold, is not without its 
problems. Alfred Bonnano, for one, has objected that the English 'neo-Kropotkinites' had 
taken to 'digging under the snow' to find seeds even in 'the structure of capital', and Read was 
often criticised for a dilettantish commitment to real struggle. Nevertheless, their position 
highlights the enduring importance of the intellectual, political and cultural forces unleashed 
by the war, forces that continued to shape anarchist politics even for those too young to 
remember it.
70
  
 
Conclusion 
The First World War was a prodigious sower of myths. But as Samuel Hynes points out, to 
think of these myths simply in terms of their truth or untruth misses their real significance: 
 
This sense of radical discontinuity of present from past is an essential element in 
what eventually took form as the Myth of the War. I use that phrase … to mean 
not a falsification of reality, but an imaginative version of it, the story of the war 
that has evolved, and has come to be accepted as true.
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Such a perspective highlights the importance of the war as an ‘imaginative force’ with 
enduring power in European history and culture, and helps explain why recent decades 
have witnessed an avalanche of books seeking to nuance, unpick and contest these 
powerful narratives.
72
 Whether it is revising the thesis that total war finally ended 
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Victorian trust in laissez-faire, nuancing the view that it marked a watershed in the 
political and social freedom of women, or contesting the idea that the war was 
fundamental in ‘ushering in modernism’, exploring and challenging these myths has 
been central to furthering our understanding of the legacies of a war now beyond living 
memory.
73
          
 Anarchism has its myths too, and as a political tradition pulled in competing 
directions by the unprecedented challenges created by the war and the revolution that 
burst to life in its penultimate year, it is unsurprising that these dogged narratives 
should cluster around the period between 1914 and 1918. Here, against the backdrop of 
the beginning of what has been seen as a three-decade long European civil war, we see 
the radical promise of anarchist politics, once the scourge of crowned heads and 
statesmen, apparently extinguished in a farce of mutual recrimination and self-
immolation. It was a movement-wide crisis epitomised in a clash between two of its 
most prominent figures, one described, not accidentally, as its most respected 
intellectual and the other as one of its most committed and fearless activists. Just at the 
moment when European rivalries seemed to confirm the anarchist analysis of the state’s 
inherent weakness and violence, Kropotkin and Malatesta, two former comrades, found 
themselves trading barbs and defending positions that the other dismissed as illogical. 
Contained within this split is rich soil for myth making. On one side, we have an act of 
apostasy from anarchism’s grande homme, showing the emptiness of anarchist ideas or 
a latent nationalism that for an onlooker like Trotsky betrayed anarchism’s 
Enlightenment roots as a toothless twin of liberalism. On the other, we have the old 
fighter Malatesta, marginalised by domestic restrictions on his activity and who, in 
continuing to call for revolution, revealed the unreality of anarchist tactics in this 
desperate and unusual situation. To cap this, with the Bolshevik triumph demonstrating 
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the power of a different model of socialist activism, we have the eclipse of anarchism 
as a worldwide movement, a politics unprepared and unable to face the radically 
different realities of the twentieth century.  
 As this book demonstrates, however, the reality is both far more complex and 
more interesting. While the division between the camps represented by Kropotkin and 
Malatesta was very real, to judge this as a simple renunciation of previously held 
principles on Kropotkin’s part is inadequate. While a popular interpretation among both 
Kropotkin’s contemporary opponents and later historians of the movement alike, it 
stems from a reading of his position that diminishes the historical vision at the centre of 
his politics. Where Malatesta placed his hope in maintaining a revolutionary 
momentum that would unmask the collusion of bourgeois and bureaucrat and reach a 
crescendo in an anarchist revolution, Kropotkin’s position rested on a different set of 
assumptions: an insistence that imperial collapse and the prospect of Europe's re-
ordering meant that anarchism’s decentralising, federal project was best served by 
protecting Europe’s revolutionary heritage from militarist reaction, and that mass 
mobilisation had undercut the Commune-model of revolutionary struggle that he had 
advocated up to that point. To Kropotkin’s mind, far from a repudiation of the anarchist 
principles he had spent a lifetime expounding, this was a more realistic means of 
achieving them. Neither, however, is the image of Malatesta as the ardent but naïve 
revolutionary fitting. His engagement with the interventionist position was not one of 
passion over intellect, but the product of a concerted effort to meet the challenge of war 
with a reassertion of anarchist principles that he too had spent a lifetime refining. In 
practical terms this narrative of division has not only tended to simplify tangled 
intellectual positions and differing readings of ostensibly shared concepts, it also 
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introduces a language of betrayal and blame that further clouds an adequate 
appreciation of the issues. There was far more to anarchism in 1914 than this.  
 If, as Hynes suggests, a myth is a story whose logic is self-reinforcing 
‘assimilating along the way what [is] compatible with its judgements, and rejecting 
what [is] not’ and then becoming a dominant frame for subsequent generations, the 
Kropotkin/Malatesta rift is an anarchist myth.
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 The real damage done by this narrative, 
as it has been refined in the hands of historians over the last one hundred years, can be 
measured by its reduction of important conceptual and theoretical debates that were at 
the heart of anarchism, to a simple clash of personalities. As these chapters testify, what 
really informed anarchism’s crisis was a rich intellectual contestation of core principles 
in the socialist political identity, a process that points to anarchism’s distinctive 
theoretical makeup, and is the seal of a living political tradition. While they were 
interrogating the politics of anti-militarism, pondering the heritage of republicanism, 
and rethinking the politics of internationalism, anarchists were engaged in a 
simultaneous effort to theorise the role of anti-colonial struggles in processes of broader 
revolutionary change, to understand how war preparedness shaped gender and sexual 
politics, and to imagine new ways of creating a free society in the face of 
unprecedented governmental intervention and monopoly. If the focus on Kropotkin and 
Malatesta’s sparring is unduly dichotomous in overlooking the range of positions 
anarchists assumed on the war, it also obscures the tactical and theoretical plurality that 
is a hallmark of anarchist political theory. While the war may have underlined 
anarchism’s failure to find a simple solution to the ruinous violence created by the state 
and capitalism, anarchists’ reactions to this moment of crisis also highlighted the depth, 
variety and complexity of the critique they had pressed, and the ludicrousness of the 
familiar representation that cast them as dangerous, chaotic and threatening.    
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 In a sense, then, anarchism’s apparent failure also underlined its strengths. 
Bolshevism did much to undercut anarchism’s appeal, persuading some less libertarian 
socialists that history was on Marxism’s side, and inspiring satellite Communist Parties 
around the world to starve domestic libertarian movements of oxygen. It should be 
remembered, however, that anarchists were among the first critics of a regime that in 
many ways simply added a fresh patina of industrial modernity to an absolutism with 
deep roots in Russian society and history.  
 Anarchists remained important voices of dissent in the early years of the Soviet 
experiment and their example was rediscovered in the 1960s, as the grip of Marxism on 
the left began to loosen. Anarchism had never gone away, but now, as students from 
Paris to Berkeley stockpiled cobblestones and reached for their paint, it chimed with an 
urgent and confrontational politics. The importance of anarchism ran deeper than just 
inspiring a penchant for disorder and sloganeering, however, and also offered more 
positive aspects than a dissection of the paradoxes and barbarities of Soviet Marxism. 
Under the stress of war decades earlier, anarchists had developed critiques of the state 
and capitalism and explored issues of racial and sexual domination that anticipated the 
necessary interconnectedness of personal and social liberation. They had also devised 
innovative methods of resistance that opened up new sites for activism and fresh 
possibilities for left convergence. Ideas explored decades earlier were shown to have a 
reactive afterlife. Taken up by a diverse range of art activists, those participating in 
non-violent civil resistance, community action projects and insurrectionary movements, 
these ideas importantly shaped  the diverse conceptions of prefigurative  politics that 
still endure in contemporary radical politics. For one onlooker, Paul Goodman, a radical 
public intellectual deeply inspired by these previous traditions of dissent, it was not 
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Sartre or Mao that lay behind this new spirit of protest, but something both older and in 
a sense newer: 
 
The wave of student protest … overrides national boundaries, racial differences, 
the ideological distinctions of fascism, corporate liberalism and communism … 
Officials of the capitalist countries say that the agitators are Communists, and 
Communists say they are bourgeois revisionists. In my opinion, there is a totally 
different political philosophy underlying – it is Anarchism.75  
 
Goodman’s enthusiasm for the student movement would fade, but in tying these radical 
values to a deeper historical vein of anarchist ideas, he pointed to processes of 
conceptual continuity and change that showed the beating heart of a politics that 
remained alive despite the travails of war and revolution.
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